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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews selected aspects of economic 
relations between the EU and Russia, focusing 
on the impact that the last two waves of EU 
enlargement have had on Russia, as well as the 
role of the euro in Russia. The analysis suggests 
that if EU enlargement has had any diversion 
effects on trade between the EU and Russia 
at all, they have been minimal, while robust 
growth in both the EU and Russia, as well as 
high oil and gas prices, has boosted trade. 
Likewise, FDI to and from Russia has increased, 
with the direct impact of enlargement again 
difﬁ  cult to disentangle from other factors. Use 
of the euro by Russian residents and authorities 
in international transactions has increased, 
albeit at an uneven pace. While, in general, the 
US dollar remains the major foreign currency 
used by Russian residents, the euro has gained 
importance as an anchor and reserve currency 
in Russian exchange rate policies. This has 
happened in the context of an overall monetary 
policy strategy aiming at a gradual shift from 
an exchange rate-oriented monetary policy to 
inﬂ  ation targeting.
JEL codes: F14, F15, F21, F36
Keywords: Economic integration, trade diversion, 
foreign direct investment, international currencies5
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The introduction of the euro in 1999 and the 
subsequent enlargement of the euro area by 
four countries, as well as the two waves of 
EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, have been 
milestones of European integration. This paper 
aims to provide an assessment of the effects 
that EU enlargement and the introduction of 
the euro have had on Russia, the largest country 
neighbouring the EU. In particular, it focuses on 
trade and investment links between the EU and 
Russia, as well as the use of the euro by Russian 
residents and authorities.
Economic links between Russia and the EU 
are found to have strengthened considerably 
in the areas of trade, investment and other 
ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows in recent years. Strong growth, 
particularly in Russia, as well as the high price 
of oil and gas, Russia’s major export items, has 
facilitated this expansion of trade and ﬁ  nance. 
Moreover, available data do not suggest that 
EU enlargement has had a negative impact on 
Russia in terms of trade or investment diversion. 
Thus, the strategic partnership between Russia 
and the EU has been increasingly underpinned 
by an expansion of cross-border economic 
activities. 
In monetary terms, the euro has gained 
importance as an anchor and reserve currency 
in Russia. The efforts of the Central Bank 
of the Russian Federation to move towards 
a more ﬂ  exible  managed  ﬂ   oat, against the 
background of the medium-term goal to switch 
to an inﬂ  ation targeting framework, may have 
been the most important reason for the more 
pronounced role of the euro in current Russian 
monetary policy-making. By contrast, the US 
dollar has remained the preferred international 
currency for investment and ﬁ  nancing, as well 
as for invoicing and foreign exchange trading, 
given its strong role as an invoicing currency in 
global oil markets.6
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1 INTRODUCTION
The introduction of the euro in 1999 and the 
subsequent enlargement of the euro area by four 
countries, as well as the two waves of EU 
enlargement in 2004 and 2007, have been 
milestones of European integration. While 
research has been conducted into the impact of 
these events on both the European and the 
global economies,1 there have been few attempts 
to assess the effects of EU enlargement and the 
introduction of the euro on countries such as 
Russia, which neighbour the EU but currently 
have no perspective of accession.2 
Against this background, this paper reviews 
the developments in economic, ﬁ  nancial  and 
monetary links between the EU and Russia – 
the largest country neighbouring the European 
Union and a strategic partner – with a focus 
on the economic impact of the two recent EU 
enlargements and the use of the euro by Russian 
authorities and residents.3 Thus, the paper 
contributes to two broad strands of literature on 
this subject, namely the impact of regional trade 
and economic arrangements on non-member 
countries and the international role of currencies. 
Above all, it aims to answer two questions: 
Have trade, investment and other ﬁ  nancial    •
links between the EU and Russia beneﬁ  ted 
from EU enlargement owing to the creation 
of a larger market, or have diversion effects 
prevailed?
Have Russian authorities and residents    •
made more use of the euro in international 
transactions, and what have been the main 
drivers in this process? 
The paper is structured as follows: Sections 2 
and 3 focus on the impact of EU enlargement 
on trade and ﬁ   nancial links between the EU 
and Russia. Recent developments in the use of 
the euro in Russia are reviewed in Section 4. 
The paper ends with concluding remarks in 
Section 5. 
See, for example, Buch and Piazolo (2001), Bureau of European  1 
Policy Advisers and the Directorate-General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs (2006), Di Mauro and Anderton (2007),   
European Commission (2008) and Padoa-Schioppa (2005a). 
The evolution of the international role of the euro has been 
documented in the annual “Review of the international role of 
the euro”, published by the ECB since 2001.
Exceptions include Glinkina and Kulikova (2007) and Havlik  2 
(2007).
For a general overview of economic and ﬁ  nancial  relations  3 
between the euro area and Russia, see ECB (2005b).7
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2.1  TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND RUSSIA: 
STRUCTURAL FEATURES AND RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS
Russia’s trade has been expanding rapidly in 
recent years, driven by the rising price of oil and 
gas, the country’s major export items. The 
country’s share in global trade roughly doubled 
from around 1% in 1998 to 2% in 2007.4 Even 
compared with other emerging market economies, 
which – as a group – have been gaining market 
shares at the expense of industrialised economies 
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008), Russia’s role 
in international trade has been strengthening 
in recent years. 
Since 1998, the year of the ﬁ  nancial crisis and a 
post-1973 trough in oil prices on global markets, 
Russian exports – expressed in current US 
dollars – have more than quadrupled. Reﬂ  ecting 
rising oil and gas prices, the share of fuels in total 
exports rose from around 39% in 1998 to more 
than 62% in 2006.5 Imports more than tripled, 
with particularly strong demand for machinery 
and transport equipment, whose share in total 
imports increased from around 28% in 1998 to 
more than 43% in 2006 (Chart 1).6 However, 
imports have remained signiﬁ  cantly  below 
the level of exports. As a result, the surplus in 
Russia’s trade balance rose from around USD 
28 billion in 1998 to more than USD 160 billion 
in 2006.
The EU is Russia’s most important trading 
partner. According to IMF data, the EU 
accounted for approximately 53% of Russia’s 
trade (i.e. the sum of its merchandise exports 
and imports) in 2007, around 6 percentage 
points higher than in 1998. The EU is not only 
the major destination of Russian exports, but 
also the major origin of Russian imports. In 2007 
53% of Russian exports were bound for the EU, 
up from 47% in 1998, while the EU share in 
total Russian imports rose from approximately 
44% in 1998 to more than 52% in 2007.
Russia’s exports to the EU are more concentrated 
than total exports. In 2006 fuels and related items 
made up 78% of Russian exports to the EU, up 
from 55% in 1998. By contrast, at around 43%, 
the share of machinery and transport equipment 
in Russian imports from the EU is almost 
Figures for Russian trade and trade between the EU and Russia  4 
provided in this section have been calculated on the basis of data 
published by Comtrade, Eurostat or the IMF.
At constant prices, the increase was more subdued. Beck,  5 
Kamps and Mileva (2007, p. 7) report that the share of oil in 
total Russian exports rose from 31.0% in 2000 to 43.4% in 2005 
at current prices, while at constant prices the increase was only 
from 31.0% to 37.6%.
Barisitz and Ollus (2007) show that imports of machinery  6 
and equipment from the EU25 alone now exceed the level of 
domestic production, possibly indicating a case of Dutch disease 
in the Russian non-fuel sector (see also Beck, Kamps and Mileva 
(2007) and Oomes and Kalcheva (2007)).
Chart 1 Russian exports and imports
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identical to the share of machinery and transport 
equipment in total Russian imports. 
In 2007 Russia was the EU’s third largest 
trading partner, with a share of more than 7% 
in exports and a 10% share in imports (Table1). 
Compared with the late 1990s, the importance 
of Russia in EU trade has more than doubled, 
reaching 7.9% in 2007. In terms of the major 
commodities traded, Russia accounts for 7% 
of total EU exports of machinery and transport 
equipment, up from less than 2% in 1999, but 
more than 28% of total EU imports of fuel and 
related items. Since 1999 the latter share has 
risen by more than 6 percentage points.
The largest EU countries – Germany, Italy, 
France, the United Kingdom and Spain – are, 
together with the Netherlands and neighbouring 
Finland and Poland, Russia’s major trading 
partners in the EU. Conversely, Russia’s 
share in the trade of individual EU countries 
is by far the highest in Lithuania and the other 
Baltic states. Finland and other new Member 
States follow, while Russia’s share in the total 
trade of the larger EU Member States, such as 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom and 
Italy, is less than 3% for exports and less than 
5% for imports (Chart 2). 
2.2  TRADE EFFECTS OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE 
ARRANGEMENTS: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE
Traditional trade theory (Viner, 1950) suggests 
that the direct effect of EU enlargement on 
trade between a Member State and Non-
Member State, such as Russia, is a dual one. 
Among the Member States of the enlarged EU, 
trade will be supported by the abolition of all 
trade barriers and the enlargement of the single 
Table 1 Main trading partners of Russia and the EU in 2007 
(percentages of total trade)
Russia EU
Exports Imports Exports Imports
EU 53.0 EU 52.2 United States 21.1 China 16.2
Turkey 6.1 China 12.5 Switzerland 7.5 United States 12.7
China 5.0 Ukraine 5.0 Russia 7.2 Russia 10.1
Ukraine 4.4 Japan 4.8 China 5.8 Japan 5.8
Belarus 4.4 Belarus 3.9 Turkey 4.2 Switzerland 5.6
Sources: IMF, Eurostat and ECB calculations.
Chart 2 EU countries’ exports and imports 
to Russia in 2007
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market (trade creation). At the same time, 
according to the theory, trade between the 
enlarged EU and Russia should decline, as 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers remain in place, 
putting Russia – like any other country outside 
the EU – at a disadvantage in its trade both 
with the EU15 and with the Member States in 
central, eastern and south-eastern Europe 
(trade diversion).7 
Trade diversion effects may be outweighed by 
market size and income effects, suggesting that 
non-member countries may also beneﬁ  t  from 
regional integration arrangements. In the case 
at hand, the enlarged EU internal market should 
raise efﬁ  ciency and income levels, which may 
increase the demand for goods and services 
both inside and outside the EU. Non-EU 
countries may also face lower transaction costs 
for exports to the EU, as harmonised rules and 
regulations apply for a larger market, thereby 
raising efﬁ  ciency.
A great deal of literature aims to measure the 
trade creation and trade diversion effects of 
existing regional trade arrangements. Results 
range from almost no effect to signiﬁ  cant 
creation and diversion effects in line with 
standard theory.8 Empirical studies and 
simulations looking at the impact of the process 
of EU enlargement on trade between the EU 
and Russia suggest that effects have been 
minimal at best. For example, for the period 
1993-2002, when trade liberalisation between 
the EU and central and eastern European 
countries advanced signiﬁ  cantly on the basis 
of the European and Interim Agreements, the 
gravity model estimated by Mordonu (2006) 
shows no evidence of trade diversion for 
Russian exports to the EU15 and the former 
accession countries. Also on the basis of a 
gravity model, Alho (2003) even reports a 
positive impact on Russian exports to the 
central and eastern European Member States, 
while Wilhelmsson (2006) ﬁ  nds limited trade 
diversion effects owing to EU enlargement. 
Sulamaa and Widgrén (2004) simulate the 
impact of the recent EU enlargement on Russia 
on the basis of the Global Trade Analysis Model 
(GTAP). Their results suggest that the impact 
of enlargement on Russia is negligible in terms 
of growth, slightly negative for imports, but 
again positive for exports. Similarly, research 
by Vinhas de Souza (2004) suggests that the 
main beneﬁ   ciaries of the 2004 enlargement 
were the EU10 countries, while the impact on 
Russia and other EU neighbouring countries 
was marginal.
2.3  CHALLENGES IN IDENTIFYING THE IMPACT 
OF EU ENLARGEMENT ON TRADE BETWEEN 
THE EU AND RUSSIA
It is difﬁ  cult to trace possible trade diversion 
effects in post-2004 trade between the EU and 
Russia, as – in parallel – substantial changes 
have been taking place in the structure of 
global trade. These include the increasing 
integration of emerging market economies – 
particularly those of emerging Asia – into the 
global economy, as well as the rising price 
of oil and gas, Russia’s major export items. 
Moreover, strong growth in Russia and the 
expansion of the euro area have provided an 
extra boost to trade between the EU and Russia 
in recent years. Finally, the liberalisation of 
trade between the EU and the former accession 
countries had started well before 2004. Thus, 
trade diversion effects may have already 
occurred, while any additional impact of the 
2004 enlargement would have to be traced 
back to the expansion of the single market.
The impact of the rise in oil and gas prices may 
be the most difﬁ  cult to account for when analysing 
There have been very few studies analysing the impact of currency  7 
unions on non-members (Bayoumi (1994) is an exception). 
Implicitly, the work by Rose (2000) on the endogeneity of 
optimum currency areas suggests that a currency union would 
have trade creation and trade diversion effects similar to those 
of a free trade area, a customs union and a single market. Micco, 
Stein and Ordonez (2003), as well as Baldwin, Skudelny and 
Taglioni (2005), suggest that the introduction of the euro has led 
to increased trade not just among euro area members, but also 
between the euro area and the rest of the world.
See, for example, Carrère (2006). Measuring the trade creation  8 
and diversion effects of regional integration is a challenge, 
as it has proven inherently difﬁ  cult to distinguish the effect of 
regional integration on trade among members and between 
members and non-members from other factors (Eicher, Henn 
and Papageorgiou, 2007).10
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the impact of EU enlargement on trade between 
the EU and Russia.9 While imports from Russia 
account for approximately 28% of total EU 
imports of mine  ral fuels, the dominance of Russia 
as a supplier of mineral fuels is much more pro-
nounced in the EU Member States of central, 
eastern and south-eastern Europe, with the share 
of Russian imports reaching more than 50% in 
seven countries (Chart 3). 
This is also because data on bilateral trade are only available in  9 
terms of values, not volumes; see Barisitz and Ollus (2007). Thus, it 
is not possible to track possible trade diversion effects in real terms. 
It should also be mentioned that gas prices rose, in particular for 
some of the new EU Member States, because Russia increased the 
gas prices charged to former Soviet republics from the low levels 
charged previously. As a result, the Baltic countries, while still 
paying lower gas prices than other EU customers in 2005-06, faced 
the highest prices of all the former Soviet republics (Czarny and 
Toporowski, 2008). Comtrade data suggest that the Baltic countries, 
Slovakia, Romania and Finland import more than 80% – some of 
them even close to 95% – of their gas from Russia.
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Chart 4 Growth of Russian, EU15 and EU12 exports to the EU15/EU12
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Slower growth in Russian exports to the EU15 
and the new Member States in central, eastern 
and south-eastern Europe (EU12) following 
enlargement might have been indicative of 
corresponding trade diversion effects, in particular 
if it were accompanied by a rise in export growth 
among the EU sub-groups. However, since 2001 
the growth rate of Russian exports to the EU15 
has been higher than that of EU12 exports to such 
countries, and the growth rate of Russian exports 
to the EU12 has been higher than that of the 
EU15 exports to those countries (Chart 4). Prima 
facie, this suggests that enlargement has not 
been diverting Russian exports to the old or new 
Member States as a consequence of the creation 
of trade between new and old Member States.
At the same time, however, oil price 
developments seem to have played an important 
role in explaining the growth rates of Russian 
exports to the EU15 and the EU12. As indicated 
in Chart 4, the growth rates of Russian exports 
to the EU15 and EU12 have been closely 
following changes in global oil prices. Thus, 
the strong performance of Russian exports to 
the EU after enlargement might largely reﬂ  ect 
the rise in oil and gas prices, making it difﬁ  cult 
to draw strong conclusions as to possible trade 
diversion effects. 
Oil price developments may also distort the 
analysis when focusing on the shares of Russian 
and EU12/EU15 imports in total EU15/EU12 
imports. The share of imports from Russia in 
total EU15 imports has been rising since 2002, 
i.e. with the rise in oil prices (Chart 5, left panel). 
For total EU12 imports (right panel), the raw data 
provide a less clear-cut message, as the share of 
Russian imports in total EU12 imports fell quite 
markedly between 2000 and 2004. However, 
it is again difﬁ  cult to draw strong conclusions 
from this, as the share of the EU15 in total EU12 
imports was relatively stable over the same 
period. When oil price increases accelerated in 
2004-05, the share of Russian imports in total 
EU12 imports rose again. This underlines the 
dominant inﬂ  uence of oil price developments on 
movements in the share of Russian imports in the 
total imports of the new Member States in central, 
eastern and south-eastern Europe.
2.4 SUMMARY
The enlarged EU is Russia’s most important 
trading partner, with energy dominating Russia’s 
exports to the EU and manufacturing products 
being the EU’s major export item to Russia. 
While, according to traditional trade theory, the 
effect of enlargement on trade between the EU 
and Russia would be trade diversion, this may be 
offset by positive market size and income effects. 
It is difﬁ   cult to capture the effects of EU 
enlargement on trade between Russia and the 
Chart 5 Share of Russian and EU15/EU12 imports in total EU15/EU12 imports
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EU. Econometric studies based on ex ante and 
ex post calculations, the latter reviewing the 
period of increasing trade liberalisation between 
the EU and the former accession countries 
before 2004, suggest that the trade diversion 
effects of EU enlargement on trade between 
the EU and Russia should have been marginal. 
Actual post-2004 trade data show a substantial 
increase in trade between the EU and Russia 
after enlargement, both in absolute and relative 
terms. However, this does not rule out the 
occurrence of diversion effects as suggested by 
traditional theory, as these effects could have 
been offset by rising trade, reﬂ  ecting  strong 
growth in Russia and the EU, as well as the rise 
in oil and gas prices. 13
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Economic theory does not provide clear 
guidance on the implications of regional 
economic integration on FDI ﬂ  ows  among 
members and between members and 
non-members of a regional agreement (de Sousa 
and Lochard, 2004). Empirical studies suggest 
that regional integration arrangements reinforce 
FDI  ﬂ   ows between member countries, with 
some possible diversion effects (Levy Yeyati, 
Stein and Daude, 2003). For extra-regional FDI 
(investment ﬂ  ows from non-member countries 
to member countries), theory is less ambiguous, 
predicting that members will become more 
attractive destinations for non-member FDI 
inﬂ  ows, as FDI is one of the main ways to enter 
the common market by establishing afﬁ  liates in 
member countries.10
Over the last few years Russian investment 
ﬂ   ows vis-à-vis the rest of the world have 
increased substantially. Total accumulated 
inward investment in Russia nearly quadrupled 
from USD 57.0 billion at end-2003 to 
USD 220.6 billion at end-2007.11 In parallel, 
investment outﬂ   ows from Russia more than 
sextupled, albeit from a low level, from USD 
5.2 billion to USD 32.1 billion. Meanwhile, the 
structure of investment ﬂ  ows between Russia 
and the rest of the world has been relatively 
stable. FDI and other investment (mainly 
loans and trade credits) have dominated, while 
portfolio  ﬂ   ows account for only 3% of total 
inﬂ  ows and less than 8% of total outﬂ  ows. The 
service sector, in particular trade, has been the 
main target of FDI inﬂ  ows to Russia in recent 
years, accounting for approximately 55% of 
total FDI inﬂ   ows between 2003 and 2007, 
followed by manufacturing, receiving around 
25% of FDI inﬂ  ows, and mining and quarrying 
(Vinhas de Souza, 2008, p. 69). 
With enlargement, the EU has become Russia’s 
largest single FDI partner, in terms of both 
inﬂ   ows and outﬂ   ows. At end-2007 the EU 
accounted for almost 80% of Russia’s inward 
FDI stock,12 while nearly 72% of Russia’s 
outward FDI stock had been invested in the EU 
(Tables 2 and 3, and Chart 6). The respective 
shares of other countries, such as the United 
States and Ukraine, either declined or stabilised 
at low levels. 
The increasing importance of the EU as the 
source and destination of Russian FDI mainly 
reﬂ   ects the fact that Cyprus and Lithuania 
have been major sources and/or destinations 
of Russian FDI. While Cyprus has been an 
important source and host country of Russian 
FDI, Lithuania has been a major destination of 
Russian outward FDI, particularly in 2005-06. 
Moreover, a signiﬁ   cant proportion of FDI 
ﬂ   ows between the EU and Russia seems to 
Concerning the impact of monetary union on FDI, the main  10 
theoretical propositions refer to the positive impact that 
eliminating exchange rate risk and transaction costs has on 
FDI  ﬂ  ows among member countries (Wei and Choi, 2002). 
Empirically, de Sousa and Lochard (2004) ﬁ  nd  European 
Economic and Monetary Union to be associated with increasing 
FDI ﬂ  ows within the euro area and between the euro area and 
other OECD countries.
The analysis of Russian investment ﬂ  ows is based on stock data  11 
provided by the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat).
FDI stock refers to equity capital, reinvested earnings and loans  12 
(registration data) in the non-ﬁ  nancial sector.
Table 2 Inward FDI stock from selected EU countries
(as a share of total Russian inward FDI stock; 2003 – 2007; in percentages)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
EU15 1) 33.4 38.6 44.7 39.9 44.5
EU25/27 2) 52.6 66.5 72.7 73.5 78.9
Memo: United States 16.4 11.9 8.8 6.8 3.5
Source: Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat).
1) France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Austria included in 2004 and Ireland in 2007.
2) As above, plus Cyprus.14
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reﬂ   ect a reinvestment of Russian capital, in 
particular via Cyprus.13 However, the growing 
importance of the EU as a source of greenﬁ  eld 
investment in Russia (UNCTAD 2006, pp. 78-82) 
suggests that its increasing role in overall FDI 
ﬂ   ows does not just reﬂ   ect reinvestment of 
Russian capital.
Most recently (Chart 6, right panel), FDI 
ﬂ  ows from Russia to the EU have increased 
substantially. However, as with trade ﬂ  ows, 
it is difﬁ  cult to assess whether this is due to 
EU enlargement, i.e. a sign of the increasing 
attractiveness of the enlarged EU as a 
destination of FDI inﬂ  ows, or a reﬂ  ection of 
other factors, such as strong growth and rising 
wealth in Russia.
Turning to portfolio investment, over 65% of 
foreign portfolio investment in Russia was held 
by EU investors at end-2007. Cyprus accounts 
for the second largest share in the total stock 
(after the United Kingdom), conﬁ  rming its role 
as a major offshore-banking centre. By contrast, 
portfolio investment in the EU by Russian 
investors has been limited. At end-2007 the EU 
accounted for slightly more than 8% of total 
portfolio investment abroad by Russian residents, 
with non-EU countries (the Virgin Islands and 
Ukraine) being the main destinations.
See also OECD (2006, pp. 16-17), UNCTAD (2006, p. 106 and  13 
p. 115), Hunya (2007, p. 9), BOFIT (2008c) and Vinhas de Souza 
(2008, p. 67). These “round-tripping”, or “recycling of money”, 
activities have also been observed in other key emerging 
market countries, such as India (via Mauritius) and China (via 
Hong Kong) (Lane and Schmukler, 2006).
Table 3 Outward FDI stock to selected EU countries 
(as a share of total Russian outward FDI stock; 2003 – 2007; in percentages)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
EU15 1) 17.7 44.1 25.5 36.7 58.4
EU25/27 2) 19.6 45.6 35.0 62.6 71.9
Memo: United States - 6.6 11.1 9.6 8.1
Memo: Ukraine - 1.4 3.2 1.5 0.9
Source: Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat). 
1) 2003 – the Netherlands; 2004 – the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; 2005 – Austria, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; 2006 – 
Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; 2007 – Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
2) 2003 – Cyprus, Lithuania and the Netherlands; 2004 – Cyprus, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; 2005 – Austria, Cyprus, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; 2006 – Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom; 2007 – Austria, Cyprus, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Chart 6 Russian inward and outward FDI stock
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Source: Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat).
Notes: “EU15” and “EU25/27” comprise the countries mentioned in the footnotes to Tables 4 and 5.15
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3   INVESTMENT AND 
OTHER FINANCIAL 
FLOWS BETWEEN
THE EU AND RUSSIA:
THE IMPACT OF EU 
ENLARGEMENT
Even before the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, 
the EU was the most important source of “other” 
investment in Russia (mostly loans and trade 
credits) – at the end of 2003 the EU supplied 
at least 68% of this type of investment. Over 
time the EU share has continued to increase, 
reaching nearly 78% of the total stock of “other” 
investment in Russia at end-2007. Luxembourg 
has been the main source of “other” investment 
since 2004, accounting for a share of 25.5% 
at end-2007. “Other” outward investment 
rose signiﬁ  cantly with EU enlargement, since 
Cyprus is the main destination for this type of 
investment by Russian residents (50.9% of the 
total stock at end-2007), followed by the Virgin 
Islands (22.1%) and Austria (6.8%). 
Flows in the form of remittances are not a crucial 
position in the Russian balance of payments. In 
2004 the ratios of gross remittances (i.e. the sum 
of out- and inﬂ  ows) to imports of goods and 
services, as well as to FDI, were below the levels 
seen in other emerging market and developing 
economies (ECB, 2007a). The same applies to 
remittances received, expressed as a percentage 
of Russian GDP (World Bank, 2006, p. 6). Net 
remittances are a negative item in the Russian 
balance of payments, as Russia has become 
a migration destination for citizens of other 
CIS countries (World Bank, 2006, pp. 46-49). 
Moreover, outﬂ  ows of remittances could also 
reﬂ  ect  ﬁ   nancial support provided by Russian 
residents to Russian minorities living abroad.
With enlargement, the EU has become a more 
important source of remittances ﬂ  owing  to 
Russia. Remittances ﬂ   owing to Russia from 
the EU account for roughly one-ﬁ  fth of total 
remittance inﬂ   ows (Table 4). Transfers of 
remittances from Russia to the EU are of much 
less importance, even though they increased 
slightly in absolute terms with recent EU 
enlargements. Thus, Russia is a net recipient of 
remittances from the EU. However, this reﬂ  ects 
two different trends, namely a net inﬂ  ow from 
the EU15 countries, but net outﬂ  ows to some of 
the countries that recently joined the EU.
In conclusion, the EU is the largest investor 
in Russia and its weight has further increased, 
both in absolute and relative terms, after 
enlargement. However, a substantial part of this 
investment originates from ﬁ  nancial  centres, 
indicating a reinvestment of Russian capital. 
At the same time, there has been a rise in 
Russian investment in the EU, albeit from low 
levels. While this is in line with considerations 
made in the literature concerning the impact 
of economic integration on investment by 
non-member countries, the dominance of 
ﬁ   nancial centres as destinations for Russian 
foreign investment calls for caution in linking 
the recent trends to market size effects which 
are related to enlargement. 
Table 4 Remittances between the EU and Russia via money transfer systems and post offices




Remittances from the EU to Russia 
EU15  1) 20.5 17.2 
EU25 for 2006 and EU27 for 2007  2) 22.2 19.3 
Remittances from Russia to the EU   
EU15  1)  1.3 1.1
EU25 for 2006 and EU27 for 2007  2) 1.8  1.8
Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation (http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/CrossBorder/).
Notes: Data for 2006 refer to the period April-December. 
Remittances via money transfer systems and post ofﬁ  ces are only a part of total remittances ﬂ  owing between Russia and the rest of the 
world. Available information suggests, however, that these ﬂ  ows have increased substantially in recent years, making them a gradually 
more important part of all cross-border transactions conducted by individuals (CBR, 2007 a).
1) Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands (only in 2006), Spain and the United Kingdom.
2) For 2006 reported EU25 countries are those mentioned above, as well as the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. For 2007 
“EU27” comprises the EU25 as detailed above, plus Bulgaria.16
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4  THE ROLE OF THE EURO IN RUSSIA 
4.1   THE EURO AS AN INTERNATIONAL 
CURRENCY: A GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
Since its introduction, the euro has been used 
not only by euro area residents, but also by 
authorities and private agents outside the euro 
area. Internationally the euro serves as: 
(1) an anchor, reserve or intervention currency 
used by authorities in third countries; 
(2) a parallel currency in the form of cash, 
domestic bank deposits and loans used by 
households and ﬁ  rms; (3) a vehicle currency in 
foreign exchange markets;14 (4) an invoicing 
currency in international trade; and (5) the 
currency of denomination for various ﬁ  nancial 
assets held (investment currency) and issued 
(ﬁ  nancing currency) outside the euro area.
Globally, the euro is the second most widely used 
international currency after the US dollar, with a 
clear regional focus on countries in the immediate 
vicinity of the euro area.15 As an anchor, reserve 
and intervention currency, as well as an invoicing 
and parallel currency, the euro is used much more 
by authorities and private agents in the vicinity 
of the euro area than in other parts of the world. 
This reﬂ  ects the strong economic, ﬁ  nancial and 
institutional linkages between the respective 
countries and the euro area.
The main economic factors underpinning the 
internationalisation of a currency are a low 
inﬂ   ation rate, a high degree of openness to 
international trade and ﬁ   nance, and a well-
developed ﬁ  nancial system with deep and liquid 
markets.16 However, a variety of additional 
factors also help to explain why given authorities 
and private agents in third countries use 
international currencies. For example, countries 
with a peg or tightly managed ﬂ   oat need an 
anchor currency, the choice of which largely 
determines the main reserve and intervention 
currency of the respective country.
The choice made by private agents to use an 
international currency is mainly determined 
by 17 : 
hedging behaviour, as well as efforts to    •
diversify the investor base and to exploit 
opportunities to arbitrage ﬁ  nancing  costs 
across currencies (ﬁ  nancing currency); 
differences in liquidity and transaction costs,    •
as well as network effects (vehicle and 
invoicing currency); 
the degree of homogeneity of goods traded    •
internationally, the size of the respective 
trading partners, market power of ﬁ  rms and 
the elasticity of demand (invoicing currency);
past macroeconomic instability and the    •
volatility of inﬂ  ation, geographical proximity 
and the presence of foreign banks (parallel 
currency).
4.2  THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CURRENCIES 
IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA – A QUICK REVIEW 
OF THE 1990s AND EARLY 2000s
In the 1990s the US dollar was the dominant 
international currency in Russia, serving as an 
anchor, reserve and intervention currency, in 
particular under the exchange rate peg operated 
between 1995 and 1998. Moreover, reﬂ  ecting 
severe macroeconomic instability in the early 
years of transition, cash and asset substitution 
based on the US dollar was widespread 
(Oomes, 2003).18
After the ﬁ  nancial crisis of August 1998 and the 
collapse of the peg, the Central Bank of the 
Russian Federation (CBR) soon reintroduced an 
exchange rate-based monetary policy in the form 
A vehicle currency (B) is deﬁ   ned as a currency used in the  14 
foreign exchange market as a means of exchanging two other 
currencies, so that currencies A and C are not exchanged directly 
(A-C) but via B in two transactions (A-B and B-C).
For details, see the annual “Review of the international role of  15 
the euro”, published by the ECB.
See the overview in Flandreau and Jobst (2006). 16 
See various issues of the “Review of the international role of  17 
the euro”, as well as Pollard (2001), Siegfried, Simeonova and 
Vespro (2007) and Mileva and Siegfried (2007).
The Federal Reserve estimates suggest that in 2002 the value  18 
of US dollar cash circulating in Russia and other countries of 
the former Soviet Union stood at around USD 178 billion, 
roughly 29% of total international holdings of US currency 
(Botta, 2003).17
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of a tightly managed ﬂ  oat with the US dollar 
serving as the anchor currency. This was 
evidenced by strong reserve accumulation, the 
smooth development of the US dollar-rouble 
exchange rate and substantial ﬂ  uctuations  in 
interest rates on the domestic interbank market.19
4.3  THE EURO AS AN ANCHOR, RESERVE AND 
INTERVENTION CURRENCY IN RUSSIA
Starting in the early 2000s CBR ofﬁ  cials 
indicated that, in the medium term, Russian 
monetary policy should pay less attention to 
exchange rate developments and focus more 
on inﬂ  ation and liquidity in domestic ﬁ  nancial 
markets, eventually leading to the adoption 
of an inﬂ  ation targeting regime (ECB 2005a, 
CBR 2007b, Ignatiev 2007).20 Such statements 
have been underpinned by reforms of the 
monetary policy framework and monetary policy 
instruments, allowing the CBR to play a more 
active role on domestic ﬁ  nancial markets.21
Against this background, the CBR introduced 
two currency baskets consecutively as a 
benchmark for its operations. In February 
2003 a trade-weighted currency basket for 
computing the nominal effective exchange rate 
of the rouble was introduced to monitor and set 
ceilings for the real appreciation of the rouble. 
Subsequently, in February 2005 an operational 
euro-US dollar basket became effective as a 
reference point for the daily management of the 
rouble’s exchange rate. 
The share of the euro in the trade-weighted 
currency basket has been relatively stable, 
ﬂ  uctuating between 36% and 41% (Table 5).22 By 
contrast, the share of the euro in the operational 
basket has been steadily increasing, rising from just 
10% in February 2005 to 45% in February 2007, 
while that of the US dollar declined from 90% to 
55% in that period (Table 6).23
The increasing role of the euro as an anchor 
currency has had a marked impact on the 
volatility of the rouble against the euro, which 
is measured by the standard deviation of 
daily returns. Volatility has been declining 
signiﬁ   cantly since 2004 and, in 2007, it 
These are the typical characteristics associated with countries  19 
which have a “fear of ﬂ  oating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000).
Esanov, Merkl and Vinhas de Souza (2004) provide a summary  20 
of Russian monetary policy from 1993 to 2002.
See BOFIT (2002 a, b) and CBR (2003). 21 
Reﬂ  ecting recent enlargements, the weight of EU countries in the  22 
trade-weighted basket increased from 45.2% for the EU15 in 2004 
to at least 57.9% in 2007. While the 2004 basket included all of 
the EU15, the 2007 basket included only 22 of the current EU 
Member States.
The basket is operated with ﬁ  xed quantities (ECB, 2005c, p. 51)  23 
and, when computing its value, the actual current market exchange 
rates are taken into account. As a result, the changes in the 
market values of the currencies have an impact on the eventual 
composition of the basket (for details, see Schnabl, 2006).
Table 5 The share of euro area countries in the trade-weighted currency basket of the CBR
(2004 – 2007; in percentages)
2004 2005 2006 2007
Euro  area 38.9 36.4 36.8  40.6 1) 
Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation (http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/credit_statistics/).
Notes: In 2003 the structure of the basket was changed on several occasions.
When computing the weights for the basket, the CBR takes into account Russian foreign trade turnover with its main partners
(34-35 countries accounting for 81.0% to 87.3% of the total foreign trade turnover in the period under consideration). Customs statistics 
relating to trade developments two years earlier are taken into account.
1) Includes Slovenia.
Table 6 The composition of the operational 
currency basket of the CBR
(2005 – 2007)









Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation.18
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converged with the degree of volatility of the 
rouble against the US dollar (Chart 7).
In terms of exchange rate levels, since the 
beginning of 2006 a change in pattern can be 
observed (Chart 8). While the rouble-euro 
exchange rate closely followed movements in 
the US dollar-euro exchange rate until end-2005, 
this relationship has loosened substantially 
since early 2006. 
The increasing importance of the euro in the 
formulation of Russian exchange rate policy has 
been complemented by the rising share of 
euro-denominated assets in Russian ofﬁ  cial foreign 
exchange reserves. Since 2001 the CBR has 
increased the amount of reserve assets into euro-
denominated instruments, gradually increasing the 
share of such instruments from around 10% of 
total reserves in 2001 to one-third in 2005, and to 
42.4% at end-2007. The share of US dollar-
denominated assets stood at 47.0% at end-2007, 
while assets denominated in pounds sterling 
(9.8%) and Japanese yen (0.8%) accounted for the 
remaining part of the reserve assets (CBR, 2008, 
p. 83). As Russia has become the third largest 
holder of foreign exchange reserves globally 
(USD 476.4 billion at end 2007), it can be assumed 
that Russia is one of the world’s largest holders of 
euro denominated foreign exchange reserves.24 
A substantial part of Russia’s foreign exchange 
reserves represents funds accumulated by the Oil 
Stabilisation Fund (OSF), formally established in 
January 2004.25 The OSF is managed by the CBR 
on behalf of the government 26, with assets invested 
with a currency breakdown of 45% US dollar, 
45% euro and 10% pound sterling (Ministry of 
Finance, 2007). 
In August 2005 the CBR began ofﬁ  cial 
intervention operations on the domestic rouble/
euro market (Reuters, 2005). More recently, 
Most countries do publish the level, but not the currency  24 
composition, of foreign exchange reserves. Several countries, in 
particular in emerging Asia, do not even disclose the currency 
composition of foreign exchange reserves to the International 
Monetary Fund, and thus are not covered by the IMF COFER 
statistics (IMF, 2005). Therefore, it is not possible to provide 
a more precise assessment of the role of Russia in total 
euro-denominated foreign exchange reserves.
Before 2004 the authorities made use of a “special reserve” to  25 
smooth the macroeconomic impact of oil price ﬂ  uctuations. The 
OSF was mainly ﬁ  nanced by two sources: oil export custom 
duties in excess of a reference price and the mineral extraction 
tax. In addition, the unspent ﬁ  scal surplus of the previous ﬁ  scal 
year was added to the OSF. In February 2008 the OSF was 
divided into the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare Fund 
(BOFIT, 2008a; OECD, 2008, p. 206).
Assets held by the OSF were thus included in the foreign  26 
exchange reserves reported by the CBR. In 2007 the OSF 
accounted for around 33% of Russian foreign exchange reserves. 
See also ECB (2007c).
Chart 7 Volatility of the rouble-US dollar and 
rouble-euro exchange rates
(2001 – 2007; 30-day moving standard deviation of daily 
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Source: Bloomberg and author’s calculations.
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public statements by the CBR suggest that it has 
continued to intervene in the rouble/euro market, 
albeit on a substantially smaller scale than in the 
rouble/US dollar market (ECB, 2007b).
4.4  PARALLEL, VEHICLE, FINANCING AND 
INVESTMENT CURRENCY – THE CONTINUED 
DOMINANCE OF THE US DOLLAR
In contrast to its ofﬁ  cial use, available evidence 
suggests that the US dollar continues to be 
the preferred international currency used by 
Russian households and businesses, as well 
as Russian participants in global ﬁ  nancial and 
goods markets. 
The US dollar remains the preferred parallel 
currency of Russian households (Korhonen and 
Merhrotra, 2007). While there are no ofﬁ  cial 
data on the currency composition of foreign 
exchange deposits and loans in the Russian 
banking system, the majority of these deposits 
and loans are assumed to be denominated in US 
dollars. However, with rising exchange rate 
stability and progress in macroeconomic 
stabilisation,27 the share of foreign currency 
deposits in total deposits dropped from more 
than 32% at end-1999 to less than 13% at end-
2007. The same trend can be observed for 
foreign currency loans, which fell from more 
than 70% of total loans at end-1998 to less than 
24% at end-2007. Anecdotal evidence also 
suggests a decline in the use of foreign cash for 
domestic transactions.28
Since the euro cash changeover in 2002 there have 
been signs of rising demand for euro cash relative 
to US dollar cash. For example, Russian banks 
have been consistently selling more euro cash 
than they purchase (Chart 9). While this might 
reﬂ  ect demand for euro cash linked to Russian 
tourism activity, it could also point to a rise in the 
demand for euro cash for other purposes. 
The volume of US dollar cash transactions 
between authorised banks and individuals in 
Russia has continued to surpass the corresponding 
level for euro. Particularly in periods of ﬁ  nancial 
turbulence, for instance during the “crisis of 
conﬁ  dence” in the summer of 2004,29 a strong 
demand for US dollar cash can be observed. 
More recently, however, there have also been 
periods in which purchases of US dollar cash 
by banks have been signiﬁ   cantly higher than 
sales, signalling a possible decline in demand for 
US dollar cash by Russian individuals. 
Similar trends can be observed on the Russian 
foreign exchange market. The US dollar continues 
to be the principal foreign currency traded 
(see Chart 10), while the role of the euro has been 
gradually increasing since 2006. Closer analysis 
(Chart 11) reveals, however, that the rise of the 
euro mainly reﬂ  ects the higher turnover of the 
euro against the US dollar. Focusing on the rouble 
exchange market only, the euro remains at less 
than 5% of total transactions, compared with more 
than 95% for the US dollar. Thus, the US dollar 
Inﬂ  ation dropped from 84.4% in 1998 and 36.5% in 1999 to  27 
15.1% in 2002, and the government budget moved from a large 
deﬁ  cit to a surplus.
See also Harrison and Vymyatnina (2007). To some extent,  28 
the decline in the use of foreign cash has also been fostered by 
administrative measures. For example, in July 2007 a new law 
became effective banning – with some exceptions, in particular 
for real estate – domestic prices from being quoted in currencies 
other than the rouble (Moscow News, 2007). An analysis of the 
determinants of foreign currency pricing in Russia is provided by 
Levina and Zamulin (2006).
In May 2004 the Russian banking system suffered a severe  29 
loss of conﬁ  dence after the CBR had revoked the licence of a 
medium-sized bank for non-compliance with the law on money 
laundering. This decision triggered a run on the deposits of some 
banks and interventions by the CBR to counter a liquidity crisis 
on the Russian money market. For details, see CBR (2005). 
Chart 9 Volume of cash transactions in US 
dollars and euro between authorised banks 
and individuals in Russia
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Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation.20
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remains the main foreign and vehicle currency 
traded on Russia’s foreign exchange market.
No ofﬁ  cial data are available on the invoicing 
currencies used by Russian exporters, or the 
settlement and payment currencies for Russian 
imports and exports. However, market analysts 
(Tsepliaeva, 2007, p. 12) assume that – despite 
the EU being Russia’s major trading partner 
(Table 1) – approximately 85% of Russian 
exports are invoiced in US dollars. This probably 
reﬂ  ects the fact that oil, priced and invoiced in 
US dollars in global markets, is Russia’s major 
export item.30 On the import side, with 
heterogeneous goods mainly imported from the 
EU (sub-section 2.1), the role of the euro might 
be more pronounced. However, owing to a lack 
of ofﬁ  cial statistics, no assessment can be made. 
The US dollar has also remained the preferred 
international  ﬁ   nancing currency of Russian 
borrowers, who have made extensive use of 
international capital markets in recent years 
(Table 7). For example, total funds raised via the 
international bond market grew from USD 2.3 
billion in 2001 to USD 60.1 billion in 2007.31 
Bonds denominated in US dollars accounted for 
A detailed review of the empirical evidence regarding the market  30 
for crude oil and current oil invoicing practices can be found 
in Mileva and Siegfried (2007). In recent gas supply contracts 
signed with Baltic countries, Gazprom, Russia’s largest gas 
company, has opted for euro invoicing (European Commission, 
2008, p. 129).
Reﬂ   ecting its strong ﬁ   scal position, the public sector has  31 
refrained from major issuance activities, while the private sector, 
against the background of rapid growth and rising investment, 
has been engaged in heavy borrowing. Thus, non-sovereign 
issuances accounted for around 85% of the total value of debt 
issued by Russian residents in 2007.
Chart 10 Currency breakdown of total average 
daily turnover for spot transactions on the 
Russian foreign exchange interbank market 
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Chart 11 Currency breakdown of total average 
daily euro turnover for spot transactions on 
the Russian foreign exchange interbank market
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Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
Table 7 Currency breakdown of total bond issuance by Russian residents
(2001-2007; in percentages)
Currency  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
US  dollar  27.9 55.1 49.3 40.0 46.1 37.2 37.0 
Euro 36.6 3.7 7.5 13.2 8.4 10.7 11.6
Other  1) 35.6 41.2 43.2 46.9 45.5 52.1 51.4
Memo: Total volume of bonds issued 
(USD  billions)  2.3  6.3 15.1 31.1 29.8 51.6 60.1 
Sources: Bondware and authors' calculations.
Notes: Data refer to domestic and international issuance by both sovereign and non-sovereign issuers. 
Data refer to ﬂ  ows for the period. 
Figures may not add up due to rounding.
1) Mainly Russian roubles.21
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37.0% of total bonds issued in 2007, while the 
share of the euro stood at 11.6%. 
The role of the euro as a ﬁ  nancing currency has 
been even less pronounced in the international 
loan market. Loans denominated in euro 
have only accounted for around 4-5% of 
total international loans granted to Russian 
residents in recent years (Table 8). The euro’s 
role as an investment currency has also been 
limited (Table 9). Available information on 
the currency breakdown of Russian residents’ 
portfolio investment abroad suggest that 
the US dollar has remained the preferred 
foreign currency of Russian residents holding 
cross-border assets. 
The euro plays a greater role as a currency of 
denomination for the deposits of Russian 
non-banks held with euro area banks (Table 10). 
However, the size of Russian non-bank deposits 
held with euro area banks is relatively small, 
Table 8 Currency breakdown of loans raised by Russian residents
(2001-2007; in percentages)
Currency  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
US dollar  77.9  97.3  94.9 93.8 93.1 92.0 87.0
Euro 22.1 1.3 5.1 4.1 5.5 5.2 4.1
Other  1) - 1.5 - 2.1 1.4 2.8 8.9
Memo: Total volume of loans 
(USD billions)  2.7  4.1 8.2 7.6 31.4 39.5 75.7
Sources: Loanware and authors' calculations.
Notes: Data refer to ﬂ  ows for the period. 
Figures may not add up due to rounding. 
1) Japanese yen and other currencies.
Table 9 Currency breakdown of Russian residents’ portfolio investment assets issued 
by non-residents
(2001-2006; in percentages)
Currency 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
US dollar 93.4 85.4 91.2 92.2 91.6 87.8
Euro 0.4 11.2 6.1 5.4 4.6 6.3
Other 1) 6.2 3.4 2.7 2.4 3.7 5.9
Memo: Total portfolio volume 
(USD billions) 1.3 2.5 4.4 7.9 17.8 12.2
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey and authors' calculations.
Notes: Equities and debt securities only. 
Data refer to stocks at year-end. 
Figures may not add up due to rounding.
1) Pound sterling, Swiss franc and other currencies.
Table 10 Currency breakdown of deposits of Russian non-banks held with euro area banks
(2001-2007 (Q3); in percentages)
Currency 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
(Q3)
US dollar 62.3 54.5 46.2 44.2 49.6 47.9 33.9
Euro 36.9 45.0 53.2 55.2 49.1 51.0 52.8
Other 1) 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.3 1.1 13.8
Memo: Total volume of deposits 
(USD billions) 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.7 4.8
Sources: Bank for International Settlements and authors' calculations.
Notes: Data refer to stocks at the end of the period. 
Figures may not add up due to rounding.
1) Pound sterling, Swiss franc and other currencies.22
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amounting to only USD 4.8 billion at the end of 
the third quarter of 2007.32
4.5 SUMMARY
The use of the euro by Russian authorities and 
residents has increased over the last few years, 
albeit at an uneven pace. While the role of the 
euro as an anchor and reserve currency has 
become signiﬁ  cantly more pronounced, in other 
market segments the US dollar continues to be 
the dominant international currency. Russian 
investors, borrowers and traders in international 
goods and services, as well as foreign exchange, 
have only slightly increased their use of the 
euro in international transactions. Against 
the background of domestic macroeconomic 
stabilisation, the role of foreign currencies in 
general has declined. At the same time, there 
are some signs suggesting that, relative to other 
foreign currencies, demand for euro cash and 
euro-denominated deposits has been rising 
recently. 
Three observations may provide some 
explanation for these trends.
First, the increasing role of the euro in Russian 
exchange rate policies might largely reﬂ  ect the 
approach adopted by the authorities in gradually 
shifting from an exchange-rate-oriented 
monetary policy towards an inﬂ  ation targeting 
regime, rather than a shift towards the euro per 
se. By introducing the two currency baskets, 
the CBR has introduced some exchange rate 
ﬂ  exibility without giving up the external nominal 
anchor which its monetary policy is still based 
upon, while at the same time preparing for the 
adoption of inﬂ  ation targeting in the future. 
Second, while the EU is Russia’s major trading 
partner, oil, mainly invoiced in US dollars, 
continues to be Russia’s major export item. 
This has repercussions for other uses of foreign 
currency, which may complement the inertia and 
network effects that characterise developments 
in the international use of currencies in general. 
For example, the US dollar may be the preferred 
currency for international bond issuance, 
as liabilities in US dollars are seen as being 
naturally hedged by US dollar revenues from 
the oil sector.
Third, against the background of increasing 
efforts to modernise and open up its ﬁ  nancial 
sector, the Russian authorities are aiming to 
strengthen the international role of the rouble 
in a global ﬁ  nancial system which is perceived 
as becoming increasingly based on several key 
currencies (Financial Times, 2007). Having 
declared rouble convertibility in July 2006, the 
long-term goal is now to reduce the use of other 
currencies in international transactions in favour 
of the rouble (Putin, 2008), and even to establish 
it as a reserve currency.33
In the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2007 a signiﬁ  cant change took place in the  32 
currency breakdown of deposits held at euro area banks, as the 
share of pound sterling-denominated deposits increased from 
just 0.7% at the end of 2006 to 20.9% at the end of that quarter. 
This may reﬂ  ect shifts in the currency composition of the OSF 
reserve assets to bring them into line with the targeted breakdown 
(see sub-section 4.3).
See Gilman (2007), referring to a comment by President – at  33 
that time First Deputy Prime Minister – Medvedev. President 
Medvedev conﬁ  rmed this goal in his speech at the St Petersburg 
International Economic Forum in June 2008 (BOFIT, 2008b).23
ECB
Occasional Paper No 93
August 2008






In this paper selected aspects of economic 
relations between the EU and Russia have 
been reviewed, focusing on the impact of the 
last two waves of EU enlargement on Russia, 
as well as the role of the euro in that country. 
It has been shown that, over the last few years, 
economic links between Russia and the EU have 
strengthened considerably in the areas of trade, 
investment and other ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ  ows.  Strong 
growth, particularly in Russia, as well as the 
high price of oil and gas, Russia’s major export 
items, has facilitated this expansion of trade and 
ﬁ  nance. Moreover, available data do not suggest 
that EU enlargement has had a negative impact 
in terms of trade or investment diversion. Thus, 
the strategic partnership between Russia and the 
EU has been increasingly underpinned by an 
expansion of cross-border economic activities. 
This provides encouragement for plans to 
set up a “Common Economic Space”, i.e. an 
open and integrated market between the EU 
and Russia, encompassing almost 600 million 
people (Padoa-Schioppa, 2005b; European 
Commission, 2007).
In monetary terms, the euro has gained 
importance as an anchor and reserve currency 
in Russia. The CBR’s efforts to move to a more 
ﬂ  exible managed ﬂ  oat, against the background 
of the medium-term goal to switch to an 
inﬂ  ation targeting framework, may explain the 
euro’s more pronounced role in current Russian 
monetary policy making. In contrast, the 
US dollar has remained the preferred 
international currency for investment and 
ﬁ  nancing, as well as for invoicing and foreign 
exchange trading, given the strong role of the 
US dollar as an invoicing currency in global oil 
markets. 24
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